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Michael D. Hurd 
Whereas the retirement behavior of males has been rather intensively studied, 
very little attention has been paid to the retirement behavior of couples, most 
likely because in a self-weighting sample there are not many observations on 
working women of retirement age (for the retirement behavior of males, see 
Boskin and Hurd  1978; Burkhauser 1980; Mitchell and Fields  1983,  1984; 
Diamond and Hausman 1984; Hurd and Boskin  1984; Burtless and Moffitt 
1985; Hausman  and  Wise  1985; Honig  and  Hanoch  1985; Gustman  and 
Steinmeier 1986; and Sickles and Taubman 1986). For example, Pozzebon and 
Mitchell (1989) use just 139 observations from the Retirement History Survey 
(RHS) to study the retirement behavior of married women. Because the labor 
force participation rate of  women has grown substantially over the last thirty 
years, the retirement behavior of women will become increasingly important 
in understanding many issues such as the future size of the labor force, the 
number of  retirees,  and the aggregate cost  of  Social Security  benefits.  Of 
particular interest is the joint retirement behavior of husband and wife, both 
because numerically couples of retirement age are more important than single 
people of  retirement  age and because the joint retirement  decision is much 
more complex than the decision of an individual. 
Most research on the retirement of males finds that the date of retirement is 
affected by the level of Social Security benefits, health, mandatory retirement, 
and, to a lesser extent, other aspects of the economic environment such as the 
wage  rate  and  assets.  For example,  Hurd  and Boskin (1984) find that the 
increase in Social Security benefits during the early  1970s provided a good 
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explanation for the decline in elderly male labor force participation during that 
period. They  further find that  bad  health  has a  strong  effect  toward  early 
retirement and that mandatory retirement at age 65 approximately doubles the 
probability of complete retirement at age 65. (The individual retires rather than 
finding another job.) Hausman and Wise (1985) obtain similar findings. This 
line  of  research  generally  considers only  husbands  whose  wives  are  not 
working, so the issue of  the joint choice of retirement dates does not arise. 
Studies of family labor supply, however, typically find that the wife’s labor 
supply is influenced by the husband’s wage rate or by the husband’s income. 
It would not be surprising, therefore, to find that the wife’s retirement date is 
influenced by the variables that help determine the husband’s retirement date. 
Whether the husband’s retirement  date is similarly influenced  by the wife’s 
variables is more of  an open question. 
Although a correlation between husbands’ and wives’ retirement dates has 
yet to be firmly established, there are several kinds of reasons why one might 
expect to find such a correlation.  If men who have a particularly strong taste 
for  goods  marry  women  with  similar  tastes,  one  would  find  a  positive 
correlation  between retirement  dates, even if retirement  dates are not  influ- 
enced  by  any  economic variables.  A  correlation  could  also be  caused  by 
economic variables: for example, both the husbands and the wives in families 
with substantial assets may tend to retire early, which would induce a positive 
correlation  in  dates.  A  more  interesting  example is  correlation  caused  by 
cross-wage effects. Cross-wage effects could be due to income effects on the 
retirement dates of both husband and wife and/or to compensated cross-wage 
effects. The compensated effects result from a utility function in which the own 
marginal rate of substitution of  goods for leisure is affected by the leisure of 
the spouse. One might well imagine such an effect particularly with respect 
to years of  retirement:  own retirement  years may be less pleasurable  if  the 
spouse is working because of constraints put on traveling and so forth. This 
kind of reasoning would suggest that husbands’ and wives’ years of retirement 
are compliments, so that, ceteris paribus, they would desire to retire at the 
same time. 
This paper has two goals. The first is to give some empirical evidence on 
the correlation between retirement dates. Do husbands and wives in fact tend 
to retire at the same time, and how strong is the tendency? The results should 
provide a baseline for future research. The second goal is to find, within the 
constraints of  the data, whether observable economic variables contribute to 
any  correlation  in  retirement  dates  and  to  find  evidence of  compensated 
cross-equation effects. 
The data set is the New Beneficiary Survey (NBS). It has the advantage of 
a  substantial  number  of  observations  on  working  husbands and  wives  of 
retirement age. Its main disadvantage is that it is a choice-based cross section, 
which limits the complexity of  the analysis that can be undertaken. 233  The Joint Retirement Decision of  Husbands and Wives 
The main findings are that husbands and wives tend to retire at the same 
time. Some of the results can be interpreted to mean that their retirement years 
are  compliments.  There  is  weaker  evidence  that  some  of  each  spouse’s 
economic variables influence the retirement age of the other, but the findings 
are not robust enough to attempt to find compensated effects. 
8.1  Data 
The NBS is a survey of individuals who first received social security benefits 
in the “window,”  June 1980-May  1981 (Maxfield 1983). The individuals and 
their spouses were interviewed in October-December  1982. Nine categories 
of recipients were defined. For this study, the important ones are retired male 
workers and retired female workers.  A retired male worker received his first 
retirement benefits during the window and was entitled on his own earnings 
record,  and  similarly  for retired  female  workers.  A number of  the  female 
workers,  in particular, were dually entitled. Within each category,  sampling 
rates varied by the age of the recipient. The sample sizes and sampling rates 
are given in table 8.1. 
Although the NBS is a choice-based sample, in a static population it can be 
used for analysis, provided the proper weighting is used. For example, suppose 
that  one  wanted  to find the probability  that  an eligible  62-year-old  would 
receive his first benefits at age 63. This is a conditional probability, conditioned 
on his not having previously received benefits. It is also called the hazard rate 
or risk of  receiving initial benefits  at 63. In a static population,  the hazard 
would be the number of 63-year-olds in the NBS divided by the number greater 
than 62, all weighted by the inverse of the sampling rate. Even though one does 
not observe the actual population of 63-year-olds exposed to the risk of benefit 
receipt, that population can be estimated from the fractions of older vintages 
that  reached  63 without  having  received  benefits.  However,  in  a dynamic 
Table 8.1 
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population this calculation loses accuracy because the population of 63-year- 
olds at risk is not the sum of the older recipients. For example, if the population 
were growing, the population  at risk  would  be underestimated, SO  the  risk 
would  be overestimated. Similar reasoning  applies  to the estimation  of the 
response of retirement age to economic variables.  For example, suppose one 
wants to find how the wage affects the probability of retirement at 63. In a static 
population, one observes the entire distribution of wages and retirement dates, 
so that, in principle,  the desired parameter could be estimated. If  wages are 
growing  over time,  however,  the older recipients  in  the  NBS come from 
cohorts that had lower wages when they were 63 than the current 63-year-old 
recipients.  One would associate low wages with late retirement.  Even if the 
wage  had  no  effect  on retirement, one would  estimate that  the retirement 
hazard  at 63 increases with the wage. 
In the NBS, the respondents  and their spouses were asked extensive ques- 
tions about their work histories, incomes, assets, wages, and health condition. 
From the answers, one can construct their economic environment at the time 
of  the  interview,  but  not  in the  years  before  the  interview.  This limits the 
complexity of the retirement model that can be estimated with the NBS because 
one does not know the alternatives that caused them to continue  to work in earlier 
years. This is a weakness of the NBS compared with other data sets such as 
the RHS. The strength of the NBS is that it has a generous number of obser- 
vations on recently retired husbands and wives. 
8.2  Data Analysis 
The goal of  this section is to present  evidence on whether husbands and 
wives tend to retire at the same time. No economic variables will be taken into 
account, so the results will simply establish the kinds of behavior that have to 
be explained by a model. 
In these data, someone is said to be retired when he or she is not working. 
In that all respondents are at least 63 years old by the time of the survey and 
have received retired workers’ Social Security benefits, there is probably little 
unretirement. For the results of this section, the sample is restricted to couples 
in which both the husband and the wife have a date of leaving the last job. This 
eliminates couples in which the wife worked only when she was young because 
only jobs held after 1950 are recorded. For most of the results, the sample will 
be further restricted to include only couples in which both retired after the age 
of  54, so that the behavior accords more with what is generally taken to be 
retirement. 
In the male-worker sample, 1,536 couples satisfied these requirements and 
several  other  minor  requirements  concerning  missing  data.  The  median 
difference between the husband’s and the wife’s retirement dates is about 3.8 
years. In that the average age difference is about 3.1 years, this implies that 
many husbands and wives retire at about the same age. Table 8.2 gives the 235  The Joint Retirement Decision of Husbands and Wives 
Table 8.2  Distribution of the Difference in Retirement Dates 
Husband's Retirement Age" 
Difference in 
Retirement Dates  55-59  60-61  62  63-64  65  66+  All 
Same month  9.0  12.0  5.8  5.8  4.2  5.4  6.1 
One month  9.0  14.8  6.3  10.5  7.  I  8.5  9.4 
Two months  9.0  15.5  9.5  12.1  9.9  10.1  11.0 
Same year  19.2  32.4  23.6  26.7  25.3  20.5  24.6 
More than one year  80.8  67.6  76.4  73.3  74.4  79.5  75.4 
Observations  78  142  190  397  355  386  1,548 
Wife's  Retirement Ageb 
55-59  60-61  62  63-64  65  66+  All 
Same month  8.9  6.1  10.4  8.1  6.1  11.9  8.5 
One month  11.5  10.6  14.0  11.0  8.5  14.5  11.5 
Two months  12.7  12.9  14.8  13.3  10.9  16.4  13.8 
Same year  28.0  27.2  33.0  28.3  25.4  27.7  28.1 
More than one year  72.7  72.8  67.0  71.7  74.6  72.3  71.9 
Observations  157  132  115  173  165  159  901 
Source; Author's calculations from the NBS. 
Note: Entries are percentage of each column. 
"Based on male-workers sample. 
bBased on female-workers sample. 
distribution of the difference between the husband's and the wife's retirement 
dates. In the male-workers sample, 6.1 percent of  couples retired in the same 
month; 9.4 percent within one month of each other; 11  .O percent within two 
months of each other; and 24.6 percent in the same year. In the female-workers 
sample, even greater coordination  of retirement  dates is found: 8.5 percent 
retired within the same month. Although it is not shown in the table, no other 
concentration  of  the  difference  in  retirement  dates  appears.  That  is,  the 
distribution is flat everywhere except at differences of a year or less, where 
there is substantial mass. The table certainly suggests joint determination of 
retirement dates. 
To find if the coordination of retirement dates could be induced by the Social 
Security system, the distribution was calculated by the retirement age of the 
respondent.  The idea is that Social Security has different effects at different 
ages, so the amount of coordination of  retirement dates should vary by age. 
For example, if eligibility for benefits at age 62 causes both husband and wife 
to retire at the same time, one would expect a greater concentration  of  the 
distribution among respondents who retire at 62 than among respondents who 
retire at 63 or 64. The table has some suggestion  of  such an effect  in the 
female-workers  sample, but it is not verified in the male-workers sample. In 
fact, no pattern is apparent in both data sets. The table does not distinguish 236  Michael D. Hurd 
coordination of retirement due to economic variables from coordination caused 
by  complimentarity  in  leisure;  but  the  table  would  appear  to  rule  out 
coordination caused by  assortative mating because, while assortative mating 
would induce a correlation between retirement dates, it would not cause such 
high concentrations  within a year. 
The remainder of this section will be devoted to other ways of  studying the 
correlation in retirement dates that is suggested by the findings in table 8.2. 
The idea that husbands and wives desire to retire at the same time will be called 
the joint retirement hypothesis. 
Table 8.3 shows the probability in the male-workers  sample that the wife 
retires  in  a  particular age  interval  as  a  function  of  the  husband’s  age  at 
retirement and of the difference in their ages. For example, among husbands 
who retire at age 62 and who are the same age as their wives, 30 percent have 
wives  who retire  between  55 and 59. This number  is  calculated  from the 
relevant  subsample of  the  male-workers sample  by  taking  the  ratio of the 
number of  wives who retire at 55-59  divided by the total number of husbands 
who retire at 62. The average is unweighted because the conditioning event 
means that approximately  all the observations in a column receive the same 
weight.  Many  of  the  entries in  the  table  are  missing  because  of  sample 
selection: having selected on husband’s retirement age and age difference, one 
cannot observe the fraction of wives that retire at certain ages. Consider, for 
example, husbands who retired at 62 and are three years older than their wives. 
At the time of the survey, most of  the husbands were 63; their wives were 60, 
and some of  the wives were still working. One does not know how many will 
retire  at 62. The table does not extend beyond  age differences  of  four and 
minus one because the number of observations  becomes small. 
If the joint retirement hypothesis is correct, the wife’s retirement probability 
will vary with the age difference: the wife’s retirement probability should be 
greatest at the age difference when both husband and wife can retire at the same 
time. An example is when the husband’s retirement age is 62 and the wife’s 
retirement age is 55-59.  When the age difference is two. the wife is 60 at the 
husband’s  retirement;  when  the  difference is  three,  she is  59. One would 
expect, therefore, the probability the wife retires at 59 to be greater when the 
age difference is three than when the age difference is two, and the table shows 
that to be the case. A counterexample is when the husband’s retirement is 65, 
the wife’s retirement is 63-64,  and the age differences are zero and one. One 
would expect a higher retirement probability to be associated with the greater 
age difference, but that is not the case. Only a few similar comparisons  can 
reliably be made because of  missing data or small samples. If  one restricts 
comparisons to cells in which the husband and wife retire at the same time and 
cells adjacent to those, just five comparisons  in which the probabilities  are 
based on more than fifteen observations can be made. Table 8.4 is an extract 
of table 8.3; it has comparisons that are based on ten or more observations. The 237  The Joint Retirement Decision of  Husbands and Wives 
Table 8.3  Probability Wife Retires 
Husband’s Retirement Age 
Wife’s  Age 






































































































































Source: Author’s calculations from the NBS. 
Note:  Based on male-workers sample. Age difference is husband’s age minus wife’s age. “-” 
means the probability is not reliably observed. 
”Based on ten to fifteen observations. 
bBased on fewer than ten observations. 238  Michael D. Hurd 
Table 8.4  Comparison of  Retirement Probabilities 
Husband's  Wife's  Age  Retirement 
































































Source; Table 8.3. 
"Based on ten to fifteen observations. 
last column  indicates  whether  the comparison  supports the joint retirement 
hypothesis: six of the nine entries show support. 
Table 8.5 has the probability  the husband  retires classified  by  the age at 
which the wife retires and by the age difference; the probabilities are based on 
the  female-workers  data.  Seven  comparisons  of  retirement  probabilities 
similar to those  in table  8.4 can be  made; six support the joint  retirement 
hypothesis. In total, then, twelve of  sixteen comparisons support the hypoth- 
esis. The fraction of  successful comparisons is different from V2  at about the 
.05  significance level. 
These kinds of comparisons  are not very systematic,  and some subjective 
judgment is exercised  in choosing the cases. Furthermore, one would think 
that  age differences  would  shift  the  entire distribution  of  retirement  ages, 
which  would change the retirement  probabilities  at every age. For example 
husbands  who are four years older than their wives should be less likely to 
retire at younger ages than husbands who are the same age as their wives. 
Because husbands tend to be older than their wives, many of the retirement 
probabilities  are not  reliable  in the male-worker  data. The rest of  the data 
analysis,  therefore,  uses  only  the  female-workers sample.  The  object  of 
analysis is the distribution of the husband's retirement age conditional on the 
retirement age of the wife. The joint retirement hypothesis implies that as the 
age difference increases the probability that the husband retires at an early age 239  The Joint Retirement Decision of Husbands and Wives 
Table 8.5  Probability Husband Retires 
Wife's  Retirement Age 
Husband's  Age 
Retirement Age  Difference  55-59  60-61  62  63-64  65  66+ 
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Source; Author's calculations from the NBS. 
Note; Based on female-workers sample. Age difference is husband's age minus wife's age. "-" 
means the probability is not reliably observed. 
"Based on ten to fifteen observations. 
bBased on fewer than ten observations. 240  Michael D. Hurd 
decreases;  that  is,  the  entire  distribution  of  retirement  ages  shifts  toward 
greater ages. 
The retirement distributions, conditional on the wife’s retirement age, are 
given in table 8.6.  They are found by summing the retirement probabilities in 
table  8.5. An  example where  the joint retirement  hypothesis  is  generally 
supported is found in the column headed 60-61  and the rows labeled 55-62. 
If the husband is one year younger than the wife, he would have been 59 or 
60 when the wife retired; 60 percent of such husbands retired before the age 
Table 8.6  Distribution of the Retirement Age of  Husband 
Wife’s Retirement Age 
Husband’s  Age 





























































































































































































Source: Author’s calculations from the NBS. 
Note:  Based on female-workers sample. Age difference is husband’s age minus wife’s age. “-” 
means the probability is not reliably  observed. 
”Based on ten to fifteen observations. 
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of 63. If the husband is four years older than the wife, he would have been 64 
or 65 when the wife retired. The joint retirement hypothesis implies that many 
of these husbands would retire at 64 or 65, so that few would retire before 63. 
The data show that to be the case: just 25 percent  of such husbands retired 
before  the  age of  63. Generally, the probability  the  husband  retires  should 
increase in each block  as one moves down each column.  Similar reasoning 
implies that, holding constant the difference in age, the retirement probabilities 
should decrease as the retirement age of the wife increases. An example is the 
retirement probability at 61 or less of husbands who are the same age as their 
wives: when the wife retires at 55-59,41  percent of the husbands retire before 
62; when the wife retires at 66 or over, just six percent of the husbands retire 
before 62. 
The entries generally seem to decrease both as the age difference increases 
and as the wife’s retirement age increases. It is desirable, however, to verify 
this in a systematic way. One method is to calculate the trends in the table. 
Table 8.7 has the least squares estimates of the trends in the columns.  The 
interpretation  of  the  entries  is  the  change  in  the  husband’s  retirement 
probability  for  a  change  in  the  age difference.  In  the  example  mentioned 
before,  in which the wife retires at 60-61,  the probability  that the husband 
retires before 63  decreases by .067 for each year of age difference. The average 
of all the entries in the table is -  .033. This is a simple measure of the shift 
in the retirement distributions for an increase in the age difference. Twenty-one 
of the thirty entries are negative, which gives additional support to the joint 
retirement hypothesis. A rough idea of the change in husband’s retirement age 
for a change in age difference can be calculated from the entries in table 8.7. 
Taking the retirement ages to be the midpoints of each interval (with 67 for the 
upper  interval),  one finds that  a change  of  a year  in  the  age difference  is 
associated with an increase in the husband’s retirement age of  .44 year. 
Table 8.8 has the change in the husband’s retirement probability for a change 
in the wife’s retirement age, holding constant the age difference. For example, 
when the age difference is zero, the probability that the husband retires before 
Table 8.7  Change in Husband’s Retirement Probability for a Change in 
Age Difference 
Wife’s Retirement Age 
Husband’s 
Retirement Age  55-59  60-61  62  63-64  65  66 + 
55-59  ,009  -.042  ,012  -.010  -.003  ,005 
55-61  -  ,016  -.057  .005  -.018  -.017  ,013 
55-62  -  .021  -  .061  -.067  -.036  -.011  ,011 
55-64  .015  -.010  -.090  -.lo1  -.069  ,014 
55-65  -.060  -.020  -.090  -.215  -.054  ,007 
Source:  Calculated from table 8.6. 
Note:  Based on  female-workers sample 242  Michael D. Hurd 
63 decreases  by  about  ,033 for each year  the  wife delays retirement.  The 
average of the table is -  .043. Twenty-eight of the thirty entries are negative. 
The increase in husband’s retirement age for an increase in wife’s retirement 
age is roughly .47. Again, these results are consistent with the joint retirement 
hypothesis. 
A simplified  summary of  what  the data reveal  about the joint  retirement 
hypothesis is given in table 8.9.’ The entries are classified by age difference. 
They give the percentage distribution of the difference in retirement age. The 
table aims to show that the difference in age at retirement is systematically 
Table 8.8  Change in Husband’s Retirement Probability for a Change in 
Wife’s Retirement Age 
Husband’s Retirement Age 
Age Difference  55-59  55-61  55-62  55-64  55-65 
4  ,005  ~  ,004  -  ,024  -  ,031  -  ,023 
3  -  ,016  -  .026  -  ,016  -  ,008  -  ,017 
2  -  ,012  -  ,005  -  ,008  -  ,020  -  ,013 
1  -  ,015  -  ,010  -  ,027  -  ,040  -  ,285 
0  -  ,024  -  ,040  -  ,033  -  ,140  -  ,220 
-1  ,006  -  ,017  -  .038  -.I15  -  ,065 
Source: Calculated from table 8.6. 
Note: Based on female-workers sample. 
Table 8.9  Distribution of the Difference in Retirement Age 
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43.1  17.3  15.3  10.6  12.0  10.8  5.8  14.7  10.2  14.8 
9.3  24.0  9.8  5.8  1.4  2.6  6.6  6.4  6.9  7.1 
10.6  15.4  25.8  14.0  7.7  6.2  7.3  2.8  5.7  10.4 
6.6  10.6  11.7  28.0  18.7  5.7  5.1  5.5  6.5  11.7 
4.0  4.8  9.8  10.1  23.0  14.4  9.5  6.4  5.3  10.3 
11.3  5.8  6.8  6.8  12.0  23.2  14.6  10.1  5.7  10.7 
5.3  1.9  4.9  5.3  6.7  10.3  29.9  14.7  6.5  9.0 
4.6  11.5  9.2  9.7  10.1  12.4  11.7  26.6  22.5  13.1 
5.3  8.7  6.8  9.7  8.6  14.4  9.5  12.8  30.6  12.9 
Total Percent  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Number of 
Observations  151  104  163  207  209  194  137  109  245  1,519 
Source: Author’s calculations from the NBS. 
Note: Entries are percentage of  each column.  Difference in  age is  husband’s age minus wife’s age. 
Difference in retirement age is husband’s retirement age minus wife’s retirement age. Based on combined 
male- and female-workers samples. 243  The Joint Retirement Decision of Husbands and Wives 
related to the difference in age. For example, if the joint retirement hypothesis 
is correct, then husbands and wives who are the same age will tend to retire 
at the same age; thus, one ought to find that, if the age difference is zero, a 
high fraction will have the same retirement age. In table 8.9, 25.8 percent of 
husbands and wives of the same age retired at the same age. Similar reasoning 
suggests  that  the largest  entries in the table should  be  along  the diagonal: 
couples with the same difference in age will tend to have the same difference 
in retirement age. That is exactly what is found in the table: the greatest entry 
in every column is on the diagonal. 
8.3  Models of  Retirement Age 
The results  above certainly  support  the  view  that  retirement  dates  are 
correlated, but  they  give no indication  of  the  source of  correlation:  joint 
retirement could be induced by the economic environment, by taste variation, 
or by  complementarity  in  leisure.  For  example, it  may  be  that  wives  and 
husbands  tend to retire at the same time because  the wife’s Social Security 
benefit, based  on the husband’s  earnings record, cannot be drawn until  the 
husband  retires.  One would  then find correlation  between  retirement  dates. 
Further cross-classification by levels of economic resources would allow one 
roughly to hold constant economic resources, but the counts in the cells would 
become  too  small  to  allow  interpretation.  A  useful  way  to  proceed  is to 
introduce a model of retirement behavior. It will control for economic variables 
in a way dictated by the functional form. The reader can interpret the results 
as an extension of the cross-tabulations  or as indicative of behavior. 
The vehicle for exploring the influence of economic variables on retirement 
age will be the Stone-Geary  utility function. It can quite naturally be para- 
meterized  to  include  both  systematic  and  random taste variations  that  are 
econometrically  identified.  The thought  experiment that will lie behind  the 
estimation is as follows: given at age 55 a fixed wage and a stock of assets, 
workers choose the number of additional years to work. From this point of 
view,  the age of  retirement  is an object  of  demand, and  an equation that 
explains the retirement  age is a demand equation. Because of the economic 
environment, however,  there are some important differences from the usual 
kinds of demand estimation; these differences will be discussed below. 
Suppose that the husband  and wife maximize lifetime utility given by 
(1 -  B, -  B,)ln(x - a) + B,  ln(b, -  A,) + B, ln(b, -  A,), 
in which x measure lifetime goods consumption; a is a parameter, necessary 
goods consumption; A, is the husband’s years of work (retirement age); b, is 
the husband’s taste parameter; and A, and b,  are the wife’s years of work and 
taste parameter. As suggested by the cross-tabulations  in section 8.2, b, and 
b,  will depend on the difference in ages and on random components that are 244  Michael D. Hurd 
correlated. In  addition, they  will  vary with  health  status. For the moment, 
assume that the lifetime budget constraint is given by 
pn  = w,A, + w2A2 + Y, 
in which p  is the price of  n, w,  and w2  are the wage rates, and Y is  asset^.^ 
The retirement equations are 
(1)  A, = (1 -  B,)b, -  Bl(b2w,/w, +  Y/w, -  u~/w,), 
The taste  index  of  each person  enters his  own equation and  his  spouse’s 
equation. Let b, and b,  have both systematic parts and random parts as 
On substituting the specifications of b, and b, in the demand equations, the 
demand  equations will  have  a  systematic  part  that  depends on X;p, and 
X$,  and error terms (derived from a,  and a,)  that have a complicated variance- 
covariance matrix.  From  the  specification,  the  structure  of  the  variance- 
covariance matrix is known, and it offers cross-equation restrictions. With static 
wages and prices and realizations on A, and A,,  one could contemplate esti- 
mating the parameters, including the taste parameters and variance-covariance 
matrix. 
In the NBS data, a number of obstacles stand in the way of estimation. One 
observes assets at about the time of retirement, so that the realizations on Y will 
depend on the realizations on A. Neither pensions nor Social Security has been 
mentioned, yet they surely affect the retirement decision. They have a wealth 
affect: couples with higher levels of pensions and Social Security will tend to 
retire earlier. They have price effects: the reward from working another year 
depends in a complicated way on age, the structure of the pension, the Social 
Security  law,  and  the  contribution  history.  The price  effects  act  through 
actuarial reductions  in benefits,  recalculation  of  benefits to reflect  an extra 
year’s earnings, and within-period effects through the earnings test. Full-scale 
modeling of the influence of pensions and Social Security on the retirement of 
a single person is far beyond what can be supported by the NBS because the 
data give little information on these variables in the years before retirement. 
For example, even at retirement one does not know the increase in the pension 
or Social Security that would result from another year of  work. 
The approach to these problems is to assume that realizations on assets and 
on annuities (the sum of pensions and Social Security) are representations of 
the opportunities available to a worker who is contemplating retirement  but 
that the realizations differ from the opportunities by a random component that 
depends partly on the actual retirement age chosen. This implies that assets and 245  The Joint Retirement Decision of  Husbands and  Wives 
annuities should enter equations (1) as endogenous variables. Annuities should 
have a different coefficient from assets as they are a flow, not a stock. 
Weighted averages of the data are shown in table 8.10. The weights account 
for the stratified  sampling procedure. It is evident  that there are systematic 
differences between the two samples. As would be expected, the wives in the 
female-workers  sample have a greater attachment to the labor force than the 
wives in the male-workers sample: they retire later; they have higher wages and 
higher  Social Security benefits and pensions.  They are in better health as a 
smaller  fraction  say  they  have  health  problems  that  affect  their jobs.  The 
husbands in the female-workers sample are different from the husbands in the 
male-workers sample: they retire earlier; they have lower wages, fewer assets, 
smaller Social Security benefits and pensions, and worse health. The health of 
the husband is a possible reason for the differences between the two samples: 
the wives of  husbands with bad health spent more time in the labor force; the 
husbands  had  lower earnings and greater  health  expenditures, resulting  in 
lower assets at retirement. 
The results from estimating the retirement-age  equations ( 1) over the two 
samples can be found in table 8.11. The estimates certainly differ across the 
two samples. This is due at least partly to large standard errors. According to 
the Stone-Geary utility function, the error terms have heteroscedasticity as well 
as cross-equation correlation. This was not corrected in the estimation as later 
results suggest that the Stone-Geary framework may not be appropriate. The 
emphasis here will be on the average of the two estimates. 
Reference to (I) shows that in the husband’s retirement equation the vector 
that explains husband’s tastes appears directly, whereas in the wife’s equation 
the vector is multiplied by a factor of proportionality, -  B,. In the husband’s 
equation, increases  in  the  age  difference  increase  b,, which  increases  the 
Table 8.10  Weighted Average Values 
Male-Workers  Female-Workers 
Sample  Sample 








Wage  ($) 
Social Security benefit (annual) ($) 





































Source: Author’s calculations from the NBS 
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Table 8.11  Stone-Geary Model of Retirement Age 
Male-Workers  Sample  Female-Workers  Sample 
Husband  Wife  Wife  Husband 
Ret. Age  Ret. Age  Ret. Age  Ret. Age 
A. Husband's  tastes: 
Age diff. 2 6 
6 > age diff. > -4 





B. Wife's tastes: 
Age diff. 3 6 
6 > age diff. > -4 





(all divided by own wage): 
C. Economic variables 
Constant 
Spouse wage 
Own annuity (thous. annual (b) 
Spouse annuity (thous. annual) 






-  .48 
.I9 
-  .60" 
.52 
.05 








-  .014 
.06 
983 
-  .02 
-  .oo 
-  .47 
.01 
.09 
-  .23 
-  3.90" 








-  .I4 




-  .02 
-  .I7 
-  .08 
.77 
.04 
-  .25 
-  .07 
1.15 
-  .49 
-  .61 
-  .64 










-  .23 
1.03 
-  1.10" 
-  .76 
-  .05 




-  1.29 






Source: Author's calculations from the NBS. 
Note: Age diff.  = husband age - wife age. 
a  =  It1 > 1.96. 
'Endogenous  variable. 
marginal utility of work and hence increases the retirement age.4 The average 
of  the  effects  in  the  two  samples is  about  .26 per  year of  age difference: 
increasing the age difference by a year would increase the husband's retirement 
age by  .26 year, holding constant the wife's taste parameter.  If the factor of 
proportionality in the wife's equation is negative, which it should be, one finds 
the same pattern of  signs on the age difference variables as in the husband's 
equations. 
The husband's  own health affects his retirement age in the expected way. 
It is interesting that the few husbands who say that health limits their work at 
home tend to retire later. In the wife's retirement equation, the same negative 
factor of proportionality that multiplies husband's health should multiply the 
age difference,  yet there is little consistency of  sign. 247  The Joint Retirement Decision of Husbands and Wives 
In the wife’s retirement-age equation, the wife’s taste index decreases in the 
age difference, which is symmetric with the husband’s taste index. Thus, if the 
age difference decreases (the wife becomes older), the marginal utility of work 
of the wife increases, and she retires later, just as does the husband if his age 
increases. On average, a decrease of a year in the age difference increases the 
wife’s retirement age by .27 year, holding constant the husband’s taste index. 
The responses of the husband and wife are for practical purposes exactly the 
same. The effect of age difference on the wife’s taste index in the husband’s 
retirement equation should, at least, have the same sign over the two samples, 
but there is no such consistency. 
In  the  wife’s  retirement  equation,  the  wife’s  health  indicators  affect 
retirement in the usual way: if health affects work on the job, b, decreases, and 
the wife retires earlier.  In the husband’s  equation,  bad health  increases the 
husband’s retirement  age. The effect is through  b,,  which,  if  the factor of 
proportionality is negative, decreases with bad health. This reduces the wife’s 
retirement age and increases the husband’s. 
The total effects of the economic variables cannot be read directly from the 
table because of interactions. As far as the own wage is concerned,  it has a 
positive effect if  all the other economic variables with which it is interacted 
are put to zero. However, if they are evaluated at their sample means, the wage 
effect takes the opposite sign: evaluating own wage, spouse wage, own annuity, 
spouse annuity, and assets at the sample means produces these estimates of the 
wage effects in years per dollar (see table 8.12). Thus, increasing the own 
wage tends to cause earlier retirement,  although the change is not large. 
The spouse’s wage is interacted with the spouse’s taste vector and with the 
own wage. Evaluated at no health limitation and no age difference, the average 
effect (over both samples) of the wife’s wage on the husband’s retirement is 
about -  .02 year per dollar; the effect of  the husband’s wage on the wife’s 
retirement is about .02 year per dollar. These effects are practically  zero. 
The effect of  own annuity (the sum of Social Security and pensions) on 
retirement age averages about .04 year per thousand for husbands and .43 for 
wives. Both suggest that the price effect dominates income effects: apparently, 
the annuity gain from delaying retirement is substantial. 
The  effect  of  the  husband’s  annuity  on  the  wife’s  retirement  age  is 
practically zero. An increase in the wife’s annuity on the husband’s retirement 
age is positive and of  moderate magnitude.  An explanation for this is found 
Table 8.12  Effect of Own Wage on Own Retirement Age 
Husband’s  Wife’s 
Retirement  Retirement 
Male Data  -  .02  -  .31 
Female Data  -  .I4  -  .02 248  Michael D. Hurd 
in the wife’s response to her own annuity: her retirement age increases, so the 
husband’s retirement age also increases. 
The average effect of  assets on the husband’s retirement age is practically 
zero. The average change in the wife’s retirement age is about -  .006 year per 
thousand dollars of  assets. Because these data have considerable variation in 
assets across households, asset variation can reduce the wife’s retirement age 
by several years. 
Table 8.13 summarizes the effects of the economic variables. Part A gives 
the estimated change in retirement age associated with changing the economic 
variables  from the  twenty-fifth  percentile  point  in  the  distribution  of  the 
variable to the seventy-fifth percentile point. Part B gives the changes in the 
variables that underlie the calculations. For example, a change of $5.2 thou- 
sand in the wife’s annuity is estimated to increase the wife’s retirement age by 
2.24 years. 
One might  well  ask whether the  Stone-Geary  utility  function produces  a 
reasonable representation of  the data. The response of retirement age to the 
economic variables certainly seems reasonable, but this is not really a test of 
the functional form. The utility function implies a number of cross-equation 
restrictions that were not imposed in the estimation.  They result from the appear- 
ance of both taste parameters in both retirement equations. The factor of pro- 
portionality  is  -B,/(l  -  B,)  for the  husband’s  index  and  -B,/(l -  B2) 
for the wife’s index, and  -B,  and  -B,  are the coefficients on assets. But it 
would be taking the model beyond reasonable bounds to estimate B, and B, 
from the coefficients on assets for the purpose of checking the equivalence of 
the index parameters because of other implicit factors. For example, wage rates 
are in dollars per hour, whereas the utility function refers to lifetime utility. A 
more  generous  test  of  the  proportionality  hypothesis  rests  on  whether  the 
12  X  4 matrix 
has rank one. Each of the 0 is a twelve-vector of the estimated coefficients that 
give  the  husband’s  and  wife’s  taste  parameters.  Each  retirement  equation 
produces two estimates of the 0, one from each data set. The form of the test 
comes from noting that one should be able to write each vector as 
Table 8.13 
Own Wage  Spouse Wage  Own Annuity  Spouse Annuity  Assets 
~~  ~~~  ~ 
A  Changes In  retirement age 
Husband  - 52  - 08  32  47  00 
- 40  Wife  - 61  10  2 24  00 
B  Changes in variables 
Husband  65  38  80  52  67 
Wife  38  65  52  80  67 249  The Joint Retirement Decision of Husbands and Wives 
where  ki  is  a  scalar. This  implies  that  B  has  rank  one.  The  normalized 
characteristic roots of B'B are 
.45,  .32, .17, .06. 
The second and third are far enough from zero that a formal test was not 
conducted, and B was concluded to have rank greater than one. 
The retirement equations derived from the Stone-Geary utility function are 
complicated and difficult to interpret because of the interactions. In that the 
cross-equation restrictions  do  not  seem  to  hold,  a  simplified  retirement 
equation was estimated. Retirement was made linear in all the variables. The 
results of that estimation are in table 8.14. As before, the estimation method 
is instrumental variables taking  own  annuity  and  assets to be  endogenous 
variables. 
As far as the effects of  own taste variables on own  retirement  age are 
concerned, they are about the same as the average effects from the Stone-Geary 
formulation.  Both  formulations produce  an  increase in  retirement  age  of 
husbands of about .25 per year of age difference and .27 for wives. The effects 
Table 8.14  Simplified Model of Retirement Age 
Male-Workers  Sample  Female-Workers  Sample 
Husband  Wife  Wife  Husband 
Ret. Age  Ret. Age  Ret. Age  Ret. Age 
Age diff. 3 6 
6 > age diff. > -4 










Own annuity (thous. annual) (b) 
Spouse annuity (thous. annual) 







-  .42 
.42 




-  .oo 
-  .01 










-  1.52" 
-.l8 
.I5 
-  .28 
-  .04 
.03 
,615" 




-  .08 
-  .08 
1.13 
-  .36 
-  .60 




-  .01 
-  .oo 
.41Y 
,006 





-  3.16" 
-.16 
-  1.14" 
.69 
-  .01 
.49 
.31 
-  .04 
-  .01 






Source: Author's  calculations from the NBS. 
Note: Age diff.  = husband age - wife age. 
a  =  If1  > 1.96. 
bEndogenous Variable. 250  Michael D. Hurd 
of the own health variables on own retirement age are given in table 8.15. The 
effects are remarkably consistent across estimation methods, and they are very 
similar for husbands and wives. There is, of  course, some question about the 
interpretation of these effects: they are based on the reported health status after 
retirement. They will be the result of a mixture of people who become seriously 
ill so that they cannot work, people who may have a chronic minor illness so 
that they choose not to work, and a range of people in between. Although only 
1-2  percent of the individuals report their health affects work at home, they 
work about a half a year longer than people with no such health limitation. 
The effects of the economic variables can be most easily summarized  by 
giving the change in retirement age that would result from changing a variable 
from the twenty-fifth percentile to the seventy-fifth. The changes in retirement 
age are given in table 8.16. The own wage response is practically zero here, 
whereas  in  the  Stone-Geary  formulation  it  was  about  -  .5  year.  Other 
differences are that in these results an increase in own annuities causes the 
husband to retire earlier, whereas in the Stone-Geary results he retired later. 
The wife’s response to assets is almost three times as great as before. 
The correlation  between  the residuals  from the husband’s  and wife’s re- 
tirement equation is .29 in the male data and .32 in the female data. Thus, even 
taking into account the age differences and the spouse’s economic variables, 
there still remains unexplained positive correlation between the retirement ages. 
If  someone desires to work beyond  the normal retirement  age associated 
with his primary job, often he must change jobs, and often the new job has a 
lower wage rate than the primary job (Burtless and Moffitt 1985; Gustman and 
Steinmeier  1986). One would, therefore,  tend to find a negative association 
between the wage and the retirement age. Put differently, the wage on the last 
job depends on the retirement  age, so that, according to this reasoning, it is 
endogenous in a retirement equation. To check the empirical importance of this 
observation, the simplified retirement equation of table 8.14 was reestimated 
taking the own wage as well as assets and own annuity to be endogenous. The 
Table 8.15  Effect of Own Health on Own Retirement 
Husbands  Wives 




-  .35  -  .29  -  .22 
.60  .56  .41 
-  .85  ~  .76  -  .92  - 




Own Wage  Spouse Wage  Own Annuity  Spouse Annuity  Assets 
Husband  -.I3  -  .04  -  .41  .44  .40 
Wife  -  .10  .I0  2.68  -  .12  ~  1.07 251  The Joint Retirement Decision of  Husbands and Wives 
results  are very similar to those in table 8.14, so they  are not reported.  Of 
particular interest is that the own wage response remains small. 
A further method to find the interaction between retirement ages is to estimate 
a conditional retirement equation.  It specifies that the retirement age of, say, 
the husband depends on the retirement age of the wife. From such an equation 
one can directly read the magnitude of the dependence.  The theoretical jus- 
tification is based on the conditional distribution of bivariate normal random 
variables. If X  and Y are bivariate normal random variables, then 
in which r-~,  is E(Y);  px is E(X);  p is the correlation coefficient between Y and 
X;  and u,  and ux  are the standard errors of  Y and X. Let Y be the retirement 
age of the husband andX be the retirement age of the wife. Then the coefficient 
on the retirement age of the wife in the husband’s retirement equation should 
be puJu,, 
Table 8.17 has the estimated conditional retirement equations.  The func- 
tional form is the simplified retirement equation of table 8.14 with the addition 
that the spouse’s retirement age enters as a right-hand variable. The estimated 
coefficients are qualitatively similar to those reported in table 8.14, so they will 
not be discussed further. Of greater interest is that the spouse’s retirement age 
is an important explanatory variable. Increasing the wife’s retirement age by 
a year increases the husband’s retirement age by about .25 year (average over 
both data sets); increasing the husband’s retirement age by a year increases the 
wife’s retirement age by about .37 year. As discussed earlier, a rough estimate 
of the effect of the wife’s retirement age on the husband’s retirement age can 
be  found  from the  results  in table  8.8. That effect is  .47. Given the great 
difference in methods,  this compares rather well with  the estimate  in table 
8.17. These relations between retirement ages are in addition to any induced 
by the age difference, which by itself would tend to cause retirement dates to 
be correlated. 
The conditional  retirement  results  may  be compared  with  unconditional 
results by using the theory of normal random variables. As discussed above, 
the coefficient on X  in the relation E(YIX) should be puJux. p was estimated 
to be  .24, uy to be 2.71, and ux to be 4.15 over the male workers data in 
unconditional estimation of  the retirement ages in the simplified model with 
endogenous assets, own annuity and own wage.’  Thus, the coefficient on X, 
the  wife’s  retirement  age  in  the  conditional  equation  for  the  husband’s 
retirement  age,  should be  .24  X  2.7U4.15 = .16. The actual  value  from 
table 8.17 is .  18. Table 8.18 summarizes the comparisons. 
The comparisons  are quite close and  support further the joint  retirement 
hypothesis. The general impression is that the husband’s retirement age has a 
greater effect on the wife’s retirement age than the wife’s on the husband’s. 
This accords with the generally accepted view in the labor supply literature. 252  Michael D. Hurd 
Table 8.17  Determinants of Conditional Retirement Age 
Male-Workers  Sample  Female-Workers  Sample 
Husband  Wife  Wife  Husband 
Ref. Age  Ref. Age  Ret. Age  Ret. Age 
Age diff. 3 6 
6 > age diff. > -4 









Own wage (') 
Spouse wage 
Own annuity  (thous. annual) (') 
Spouse annuity (thous. annual) 
Assets (thousands) (b) 





-  .41 
-  .45 
.I7 




-  .02 
.  00 
,007 










-  1 .5Ia 
-  .09 
.76 
-  .08 
-  .05 
.03 
,801" 
-  ,049 




-  1.36" 
-  .09 
1.65" 
-  .I9 
-  1.24 
-  .85" 
.47 
-  .24 
.37 
-  .01 






-  .033" 
3.68" 
.31" 
-  3.39a 
-  .22 
.75 
-  I.  10" 
-  .29 
.37 
.47 
-  .01 
-  .01 
,038 





Source: Author's  calculations from the NBS. 
Note: Age diff.  = husband age - wife age. 
a  = It1 > 1.96. 
bEndogenous variable. 
Table 8.18 
Effect of  Wife's  Retirement Age 
on Husband's Retirement Age 
Directly Estimated 
Data Set  (table 8.17)  From Normal Theory 
Male workers  .I8  .16 
Female workers  .33  .I9 
Effect of Husband's  Retirement Age 
on Wife's  Retirement Age 
Directly Estimated 
(table 8.17)  From Normal Theory 
Male workers  .38  .37 
Female workers  .36  .27 253  The Joint Retirement Decision of Husbands and Wives 
8.4  Conclusion 
The results support the idea that the retirement of husbands and wives is a 
joint process. Often both spouses retire within a short period. The difference 
in  age seems to  cause  substantial  variation  in  retirement  age. The rough 
estimate from the retirement probabilities is about  .45 year per year of  age 
difference. From either the Stone-Geary or the simple model, it is about .25. 
Given the wide differences in estimation methods, these estimates are in good 
agreement and certainly  support the joint retirement hypothesis. 
Generally,  the  cross-economic  variables  do not  have  a  strong effect  on 
retirement ages, so they do not provide a good explanation for the correlation 
of retirement dates.  But  it would be  surprising to have strong cross-effects 
given that the own effects are not strong. Surely, this is at least partly due to 
weaknesses in the data and to the simplified estimation methods required by 
the data. In particular, one cannot construct the economic environment in the 
years before retirement. 
The residual correlation between the retirement ages of husbands and wives 
also supports the joint retirement hypothesis.  Of course, one does not know 
the cause of the correlation: it could be due to neglected economic variables, 
assortative mating, or true complementarity in the utility function. 
Much more research on the joint retirement decision is needed. In particular, 
a close modeling of  Social Security and pensions should be able to separate 
the  wealth  effects  from  the  price  effects.  Nothing  was  done  here  about 
adjustment of hours within a year, which is often accompanied by a reduction 
in the wage rate. One would hope that future research would be able to account 
for these problems and to find the extent of true Complementarity in retirement. 
Notes 
I. Henretta and O’Rand (1983) find in the RHS that increasing the age of the wife 
decreases the probability that she will retire after the husband, which seems to imply 
a correlation. But this result cannot be interpreted as a joint retirement decision: one 
would get the same result if individuals in the sample were randomly attached to other 
individuals simply because  increasing age is associated with decreased labor force 
participation. 
2. This table was suggested by David Ellwood. 
3. The model does not have a role for the adjustment of annual hours of work. In 
this formulation, the wage is implicitly the annual wage (earnings); but in the estimation 
the hourly wage is used as it is surely a better measure of the cost of  leisure. 
4. The dependence of tastes on the age difference was, in estimation not reported 
here, represented by ten dummy variables; the relation was close enough to linear that 
tastes were made linear in age differences between minus four and six. 
5. This correlation is slightly different from what was reported earlier because it 
comes from an equation in which the own wage is endogenous. 254  Michael D. Hurd 
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Comment  Gary Burtless 
Michael Hurd’s paper has two main goals. The author would like to provide 
good  baseline  information  about  the  presence  and  magnitude  of correlated 
retirement dutes among working spouses. Do working spouses tend to retire 
on or around the same day? How large is the correlation? The second goal is 
to determine  whether  and  how  much  economic  variables  contribute to  the 
correlation in retirement dates. Is the correlation in retirement more or less than 
would  be expected  given  the correlation  in other variables that  affect each 
spouse’s  retirement age? When describing his latter goal, Hurd prudently adds 
Gary Burtless is a senior fellow in economic studies at the Brookings Institution, Washington, 
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that he will try to establish the facts “within  the constraints of the data.” As 
we shall see below, the constraints imposed by the data are severe. 
The author mentions three reasons to expect some correlation in retirement 
dates: (a)  sorting of  marital partners by tastes, so that men and women who 
like to work or shirk seek out and wed a similarly inclined spouse; (b)  effects 
of economic variables, such as asset income, that are shared by both spouses 
and  affect the  behavior of each; and (c)  simultaneous determination  of the 
utility  each  spouse  derives  from retirement.  A  retired  worker  who  has  a 
working spouse may enjoy less utility-at  the same income level-than  the 
same worker would obtain if  his or her spouse were retired. 
The first two  reasons  for  correlation  in  retirement  do not  cause  serious 
problems for the separate estimation of the retirement equations of husbands 
and wives. If there is a correlation in taste for work among marriage partners, 
for example, no special problems arise in estimation. In estimating an equation 
that explains husbands’ retirement age, it is interesting and useful to learn that 
a correlation exists in the retirement ages of the two spouses. We could improve 
the efficiency  of  the  unknown  parameters  in the retirement equation  if  the 
Correlation in the error terms were taken into account. But, if the correlation 
in  errors  is  ignored,  there  seems  no  reason  to  believe  that  the  parameter 
estimates would be biased. 
Similarly, in a static retirement model it would sometimes be useful to know 
that retirement ages of husbands and wives are correlated because both spouses 
face similar environmental factors.  But, when the analyst has no particular 
interest  in  this  correlation,  nothing  is  lost  if  it  is  ignored.’ The simplest 
estimation strategy is to include the wage of both spouses, the health status of 
both  spouses, and the pension incentives facing each spouse in the separate 
equations for each spouse. 
The third issue seems to me much more difficult to handle. Suppose we were 
given a data set with good information on retirement ages and the economic, 
health,  and demographic determinants of retirement. If husbands and wives 
tend to retire on the same calendar date, irrespective of the other determinants 
of their individual retirement ages, this fact may have to be explicitly taken into 
account  if  the  analyst  wants  to  obtain  unbiased  estimates  of  the  other 
coefficients in the system. The retirement age of the wife may be influenced, 
not only by the exogenous determinants of her husband’s retirement age, but 
also by the actual realization of that age. How important is the bias that follows 
from ignoring this correlation? Before reading this paper, I would have thought 
that the potential bias is small. 
This set of issues is examined using the New Beneficiary Survey (NBS), a 
survey  of  workers who  began  collecting Social Security old  age insurance 
(OAI) benefits between June 1980 and  May  1981. The sample is explicitly 
selected  on  the  basis  of  the  retirement  or  benefit  acceptance  choice  of 
respondents. 
The choice-based nature of the selection process introduces serious prob- 
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if we consider the subsample of 62-year-old men, we note two types of sample 
exclusions that affect the representativeness of the remaining sample. First, the 
survey excludes those workers who have already retired and accepted Social 
Security disability insurance (DI) benefits. And it excludes 62-year-old men 
who will accept their OAI pension at a later age. If we are interested only in 
the retirement  behavior of  nondisabled  men, the first exclusion  is not  very 
troubling.  But  the  second  exclusion-of  nonretired  62-year-olds-is  ex- 
tremely  serious.  The NBS  sample systematically  excludes information  on 
62-year-olds  who  have  greater  taste  for work and  who have  independent 
variables associated with above-average retirement ages. This exclusion will 
clearly bias any inference we want to draw about the retirement behavior of all 
nondisabled 62-year-old men. 
As Hurd points out, the effects of the sample exclusion can be overcome 
under  certain  assumptions,  in  particular,  under  the  assumption  that  the 
economic and demographic determinants of retirement are constant across time 
and across age cohorts. Although we are missing data on 62-year-olds who 
wish to retire later than average, we possess data on 65- and 70-year-olds who 
do retire later than average. If  the population is static,  the data set contains 
information  on a good cross  section of  individual  tastes and economic and 
demographic determinants of retirement. 
In a sample as aged as this one, however, it may not be plausible to assume 
that population conditions are static. Mortality rates, especially among men, 
are quite high between  ages 62 and 72. Some 62-year-old workaholics  will 
never survive long enough to accept a Social Security pension. These are the 
hard drivers who work until they drop-or  at least they drop sometime before 
age 72 when they would be mailed a check even without retiring. You always 
resented these characters  in high school and college-unless  you  were one 
yourself. They messed up the grading curve in school, and now they screw up 
our  econometric  models  by  denying  us  deathbed  information  on  critical 
X-variables. 
In addition, Hurd points out that it would be dangerous to assume that the 
population is static, anyway. Economic variables-such  as the wage-are  not 
constant across successive cohorts. To take a simple example, if the wage is 
higher in each cohort, workers retiring at age 70 could have a worse earnings 
record  than workers  retiring  at age 62. Even if  the wage has no effect  on 
retirement, the analyst using this data set might incorrectly conclude that low 
wages lead to later retirements. 
Hurd might also have mentioned a further economic factor, one that seems 
especially significant in light of  his views on the effects of Social Security on 
early retirement. The younger retirees in the NSB sample were affected by the 
most dramatic benefit cut in social security history.  Those of you who read 
Dear Abby will know what I am talking about: the notorious Social Security 
“notch babies.”  They are not exactly spring chickens today, of course, since 
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benefit cuts as a result of the Social Security amendments  passed in  1977, 
which  became  effective  in  1979. About half  Hurd’s  sample was  born just 
before the notch took effect, while the remaining half had the bad luck to be 
born just after. 
You might think this issue is relevant only to cranks who write Dear Abby 
or who badger hapless congressmen in Washington. To allay these suspicions, 
let me report a couple of numbers. 
If you were an average-wage worker, had worked steadily throughout your 
career, and turned 65 on 31 December  1981, you would  have received a 
Social Security check on 1 January  1982 equal to 51 percent of  your last 
month’s earnings in December. 
If you had an identical earnings record but the great misfortune to turn 65 
on 2 January 1982, your 1 February 1982 Social Security check would have 
been just 41 percent of your December wage earnings. 
In other words, the benefit replacement rate dropped from 51 to 41 percent at 
midnight,  1 January  1982. For you who are a little slow at arithmetic, that is 
a 20 percent drop in real benefits for the identical earnings record. 
Not only did notch babies receive sharply lower benefits if they retired at age 
65, but they also obtained much  smaller benefit  increments if  they  delayed 
retirement for additional years. 
Boskin and Hurd (1978) found that the benefit increase in 1972-73  had a 
major effect on retirement patterns after  1972. (That conclusion is repeated 
near the beginning of this paper.)  I would expect equally dramatic effects of 
the  benefit  cut passed  in  1977. Do we  see any delay  in retirement  among 
“notch  babies”? 
Interesting though this question is, Hurd does not directly address it in this 
paper.  Rather,  he wants to know whether there is a correlation between the 
retirement  dates chosen by husbands and wives. How important is this cor- 
relation? The evidence in the paper suggests that the issue merits some attention. 
In his first set of  tabulations,  Hurd finds that there is some tendency  for 
husbands and wives to retire near the same calendar date. Partly, this is because 
the husbands and wives he looks at tend to  have similar calendar ages and 
because he excludes from his comparisons those couples who retire at widely 
different  ages.  Within  the  sample  of  couples  he  looks  at, however,  there 
appears to be some clustering of  retirement dates. 
The cross-tabulations used to draw this inference are based on a relatively 
small proportion  of the observations in the NBS. One of the reasons is that 
families are excluded if  either husband or wife stopped working by age 54. 
Another reason is that retirement ages were required for both  husbands and 
wives-so,  if  the spouse of  the  new beneficiary  had not yet retired by  the 
interview date, the observation was excluded. Both these criteria will tend to 
exclude couples with wide differences in retirement ages and, presumably, in 
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Nonetheless, Hurd’s conclusion appears to be borne out using a variety of 
different analytic techniques and number of cross-classification  schemes.  In 
the concluding section of the paper, Hurd presents estimates of a reduced-form 
joint retirement equation, one that links information about both husbands and 
wives in estimating the separate retirement behavior of the two spouses. Given 
the limitations of his data set, the exact coefficient estimates should probably 
be viewed with some skepticism. 
Even taking account ofall thestatistical problems with theestimationprocedures, 
however, it is still reasonable to conclude, as Hurd does, that the correlations in 
the data support his basic inference: for many couples in the sample, retirement 
is a jointly determined process. Only a fraction of the correlation in retirement dates 
is explained by the observable economic variables that affect both members of a 
married couple. 
Having satisfied ourselves that Hurd’s inference is a reasonable one, how 
should we alter the statistical methods typically  used to estimate retirement 
models? In certain kinds of models, it is feasible to account explicitly for the 
correlation of  husband and wife retirement dates.  Where this  is  feasible,  it 
certainly should be done. For many models, however, it would be extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to control statistically for the correlation between 
retirement  dates  of  husbands  and  wives.  The results  in  this  paper,  while 
suggestive, do not seem strong enough to require us to toss out the findings 
obtained from the latter type of  model. 
Note 
1. For example, most analysts have been interested in the effects of Social Security, 
private pensions, or health on retirement ages. If the specification of these factors in 
the individual retirement equations is correct, no explicit account need be taken of the 
correlation in spouses’ retirement ages arising from the correlation in their environ- 
mental factors. 
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